Stable Partial Agglomeration in a New Economic Geography Model with Urban Frictions by Barde, Sylvain
 1
Stable partial agglomeration in a New Economic Geography model  
with urban frictions. 
 
Sylvain Barde 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Kent 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper extends the Puga (1999) model by introducing urban frictions. It 
assumes that the agglomeration of manufacturing in a city imposes a cost on the 
inhabitants of the agglomerated region. Furthermore, an implicit function methodology 
is developed to provide a numerical stability function that does not require prior 
analytical work. Simulations reveal that these numerical stability conditions are 
consistent with the original Puga (1999) analytical predictions. 
The central finding is that the extension significantly alters the agglomeration 
properties of the original Puga framework. In particular, partial agglomeration becomes 
a stable long run outcome in both with and without migration. Furthermore, the level of 
sensitivity of the agglomeration to the friction cost market parameters is shown to be 
different in the both cases. This outlines the need to evaluate the imperfectness of 
migration when modifying the urban geography as a policy implication 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: R11, R12, F12 
Keywords: Agglomeration, new economic geography, migration, urban friction 
 
Address for Correspondence: Department of Economics, University of Kent, 
Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP. Telephone: 01 227 82 76 39 Email: sb71@kent.ac.uk 
 2
Stable partial agglomeration in a New Economic Geography model 
with urban frictions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to recent work by Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud (2006), partial agglomeration cannot be stable in a New Economic Geography 
framework. However, this disagrees with the urban mismatch literature, in which 
several studies point out that partial agglomeration is possible if the labour markets and 
the urban land markets are allowed solve together1. This is especially true in Smith and 
Zenou (1995), which show, in a two-city case, that it affects the migration between 
cities, and can help sustain partial agglomeration. Breukner and Zenou (1999) confirm 
this by showing that adding a land market to a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework, the 
extra frictions from urbanisation provides a force which limits migration. The purpose 
of this paper is therefore to investigate whether this is also the case in a NEG 
framework. 
This paper shows that stable partial agglomeration can be obtained by 
integrating the costs of urbanisation into the Puga (1999) model. The choice of this 
model rests on the fact that due to its analytical results, its integration of vertical 
linkages and its capacity to cope with both migration and non-migration it is a 
cornerstone of the NEG literature. Including even a simple frictional urbanisation cost 
that solves simultaneously with the labour market means that the cost of urbanisation 
will increase as agglomeration grows, introducing an extra dispersion force, which 
makes partial agglomeration a much more likely outcome. This study shows that this 
                                                 
1 These papers are mainly: Smith and Zenou (1995), Breukner and Zenou (1999), 
Wasmer and Zenou (2000) Breukner, Thisse and Zenou (2002) and Zenou (1999). 
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has several important implications. One is that this modifies the Robert-Nicoud (2004) 
and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) results mentioned above. Another implication 
is that this can potentially create problems for researchers who attempt to use the 
original Puga stability conditions in empirical studies, as we shall show that the 
agglomeration properties of the model are sensitive both to urban friction and the 
freeness of migration. The cases of Head and Mayer (2004) and Brakman et al (2006) 
are illustrations of this and this study shows how their results could be modified by the 
inclusion of a land market, and its effects on the stability conditions. 
The remained of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 modifies the 
original Puga (1999) framework to include urban frictions. Section 3 presents the 
numerical method of evaluating the stability of the system that will be used throughout 
the paper. The simulations of the migration and non-migrations versions of the extended 
model are then presented in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 discusses the consequences of 
the extension and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The Puga model with urban frictions 
 
The spatial mismatch literature mentioned above suggests the possibility of 
stable partial agglomeration when the labour market and some form of urban friction are 
allowed to solve simultaneously. This section therefore introduces such a friction, even 
if it is in a simplified manner, in the Puga (1999) framework. First of all, the 
agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in the Puga model is assumed to proxy for 
urbanisation. We then assume the existence of an urbanisation cost, which is a positive 
function of the size of the manufacturing sector in a region. The burden of this regional 
urbanisation cost is assumed to be equally shared between the workers in a region. This 
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creates a simple setting, in which agglomeration of manufacturing in one region is 
matched by a relatively high urban friction costs in the agglomerated region, and by low 
urban friction costs in the region devoid of manufacturing activity. 
 
In order to clarify exactly how the extension modifies the Puga (1999) model, it 
is important to briefly reiterate the original framework. The full model, as specified in 
appendix of Puga (1999) consists of the following set of equations (1.1)-(1.4).  
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
q w
Tq wL Kr w n nq w q w
µ σ µ σ
σ µ σ µµ σµ
σπ
γ γ µ σ π µ
− − −
− − −
= ×
+ + − − + −
 (1.1) 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 ˆ ˆ 0µ σ µ σσ − − −− − =q Tq w n  (1.2) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 0wL n q w w Kr wµ µµ σ π− −− − + −1 + =  (1.3) 
 1 11Tq w q w
M
γ γ− −=  (1.4) 
The system variables are profits π, the number of firms n, the industrial price index q, 
wages w, and in the case of migration, labour L2. This system has one more endogenous 
variable than equation, and solving it requires fixing either firms n or profits π. Fixing 
the number of firms n allows to solve for profits, and models the short run equilibria. 
Setting profits equal to zero allows to solve for the equilibrium number of firms in the 
long run. For a full explanation of the derivations of these equations, the reader is 
referred to Puga (1999). 
 
 The assumption that is made is that all manufacturing firms and workers locate 
in a city. In a given region, the urban frictions resulting from the existence of a city 
therefore depend on the size of the manufacturing sector in that region. This depends 
                                                 
2 In the case where migration is not allowed, the variable L becomes exogenous, and the 
equation (1.4), which models the equalisation of real wages through migration, is 
dropped. 
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first of all on in , the number of manufacturing sector firms, located in region i. 
Secondly, this includes the number of manufacturing workers located in that region, 
given by the first part of equation (1.3) and equal to: 
( ) ( )( )11 i i i i in q w wµ µµ σ π− −− + −1  
Given this, the size of the city or urban area C in region i can be measured by the 
number of manufacturing sector agents present in the region: 
 ( ) ( )( )11i i i i i i iC n q w w nµ µµ σ π− −= − + −1 +   (2) 
The per capita cost of urban friction ic  is a positive function of city size: 
 ( )i ic C ϕχ=  (3) 
The positive parameter ϕ is included to allow for the fact that the effect of city size on 
the demand for locations may be non-linear and χ is a calibration parameter which 
quantifies how much an increase in city size increases the per-capita costs of 
agglomeration. Replacing city size iC , the urbanisation friction cost per unit of labour 
can be written as: 
 ( ) ( )( )( )11i i i i i i ic n q w w n ϕµ µχ µ σ π− −= − + −1 +  (4) 
 
Because the friction cost ic  is imposed on all of the population of region i, it 
only enters the model via the disposable income of consumers. It is important to explain 
at this point why the urban friction cost ic  is paid by workers of all sectors, both 
manufacturing and agricultural. The assumption that the costs of urbanisation are 
equally spread between agricultural and manufacturing worker seems initially counter-
intuitive. It can be satisfactorily explained, however, by existence of economy-wide 
agglomeration costs, as well as the need to conserve the intersectoral properties of the 
Puga (1999) model.  
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Even though the framework presented above is simplified, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that there exists some costs to agglomeration that are imposed on all workers 
in society. A first example would be negative externalities to agglomeration, which 
depend positively on the size of the urban area or the manufacturing sector and which 
impose a cost on all of society in a region. Pollution is a good example of such an 
externality. Another urbanisation cost that can be spread out over the entire population 
is the provision of urban infrastructure to the manufacturing sector as agglomeration 
occurs. The cost of providing this infrastructure is usually covered by the state, and paid 
for by taxes. If developing urban infrastructure is a priority for the state, then one could 
imagine that the agricultural sector would also contribute taxes towards providing the 
infrastructure. Importantly, regardless of how these costs are shared over the population, 
the mechanism that is captured by this extension is that if manufacturing starts to 
agglomerate in one region, then the social cost imposed by this agglomeration will be 
higher in that region than in the non-agglomerated region, reflecting the costs of 
urbanisation. 
Another central reason why this assumption is made is that it preserves one of 
the properties of the intersectoral adjustment in the Puga (1999) model. In the original 
model, all workers in a region i earn the same wage at equilibrium, whether they supply 
their work to the agricultural or manufacturing sector. Because they are faced with the 
same prices, their real wage is also the same. This means that at equilibrium, the 
marginal worker is indifferent to working in either sector and there is no intersectoral 
adjustment. This equalisation of real wages between sectors at equilibrium makes sense 
from an economic point of view, and it is important that this property be conserved in 
the extension. What this fundamentally means is that in the long run, the cost to the 
manufacturing worker of living in a city is equal to the cost to the agricultural worker of 
not living in the city. Because both earn the same wage this means that at equilibrium, 
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the marginal worker is still indifferent between moving location and changing sectors, 
at the same time. 
 
 As explained above, it is assumed that the urban frictions directly reduce the 
wages of workers, in other words, they are taken from the wages as a lump sum before 
the workers start consuming. The consumer utility function is the same as in Puga 
(1999), and there is now a difference between wages w and the disposable income of 
workers w-c. Solving the utility maximisation problem gives the aggregate consumer 
expenditure on manufactures, where γ is the share of expenditure on manufactures: 
 ( )i i iw c Lγ −  (5) 
This new consumer expenditure then enters the demand function alongside other 
manufacturing and agricultural expenditures in the same fashion as in Puga (1999). 
 Furthermore, as was the case in the original model, in the long run the real 
wages in both regions will equalise when migration between the regions is allowed. 
Including the effect of urban rent on real wages and the assumption that all sectors pay 
the rent, the long run equality of the real wages between regions can now be expressed 
as: 
 ( ) ( )i i i j j jq w c q w cγ γ− −− = −  (6) 
 The simple way in which the rent c feeds back into the model is a property of the 
assumption that both manufacturing and agricultural workers pay the rent. In Puga 
(1999), they have the same utility function by assumption and the same wage by 
construction. This allows the consumption of all workers in a region to be determined 
simply as wLγ × . . Because the frictional urbanisation costs apply in some way to 
agricultural an manufacturing workers, one can write the aggregate consumption of 
labour ( )w c Lγ × − , as shown in equation (5), and maintain the analytical simplicity of 
Puga (1999). This is an important aspect, as the aim of the chapter is to see how the 
 8
frictions modify agglomeration in the Puga model. It is therefore important to keep the 
extended model comparable to the original framework. 
A more refined model would separate the urban and rural costs linked to the 
expanding urban area, as well as allow for a nominal wage differential between the 
urban manufacturing and agricultural worker. Real wages would still adjust at 
equilibrium, but such a model would require that the two sources of worker 
consumption in the expenditure equation have to be separated, as the disposable income 
of agricultural and manufacturing workers become different. The effects of the frictions 
on agglomeration shown later in this chapter would still exist, but the model would be 
less tractable. 
 
 Given the existing Puga model and the urban friction modifications shown 
above, the extended system can be described by equations (7.1)-(7.5) below: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
q w
Tq w c L Kr w n nq w q w
µ σ µ σ
σ µ σ µµ σµ
σπ
γ γ µ σ π µ
− − −
− − −
= ×
− + + − − + −
 (7.1) 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 11 ˆ ˆ 0µ σ µ σσ − − −− − =q Tq w n  (7.2) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 0wL n q w w Kr wµ µµ σ π− −− − + −1 + =  (7.3) 
 ( ) ( )( )( )1ˆ ˆ ˆ1c n q w w n ϕµ µχ µ σ π− −= − + −1 +  (7.4) 
 ( ) ( )1 11Tq w c q w c
M
γ γ− −− = −  (7.5) 
This extended model still nests the original Puga (1999) model. If the friction share 
parameter χ is set to zero, equation (7.4) reduces to 0c = , the extra variable c 
disappears from the model, and the model reverts to the original setting (1.1)-(1.4). This 
also means that this model still solves as explained above. Any short run equilibrium 
can be computed by setting the firm mass exogenously and calculating profits. The long 
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run equilibria are solved for by setting profits exogenously to zero and solving for the 
firm mass. 
 
 
3. An implicit function method for determining stability 
 
Before moving on to simulations of the extended system (7.1)-(7.5), this section 
explains the numerical methodology developed to asses the effect of the extension on 
the stability of the symmetric equilibrium. This methodology is based on the fact that 
most of the numerical solvers used for simulating problems such as the system (1.1)-
(1.4) require that it be re-arranged in the form shown in (8.1), by subtracting the right 
hand side from both sides of each equation. The solver algorithms then typically search 
for the set of variables that make the right hand side equal to zero. It is possible to take 
advantage of this to directly calculate, as a part of the simulation, a numerical stability 
function for the symmetric equilibrium. This calculation rests on the implicit function 
theorem, extended to a simultaneous system of equations. 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
3
4
, , , , 0
, , , , 0
, , , , 0
, , , , 0
F q w L n
F q w L n
F q w L n
F q w L n
π
π
π
π
=⎧⎪ =⎪⎨ =⎪⎪ =⎩
 (8.1) 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
3
4
f n
q f n
w f n
L f n
π =⎧⎪ =⎪⎨ =⎪⎪ =⎩
 (8.2) 
The system 1 4F F−  describes a set of implicit functions 1 4f f−  as described in (8.2) if 
the equations 1 4F F− are continuous and twice differentiable, and if, for a set of points 
{ }* * * * *, , , ,q w L nπ  which are a solution to (8.1), the following holds: 
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1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
0
F F F F
q w L
F F F F
q w L
J
F F F F
q w L
F F F F
q w L
π
π
π
π
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ≠∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (9) 
If the condition holds, in other words the matrix of partial derivatives of the system is 
non-singular, then by the implicit function theorem, the following is true in the region 
around the solution point { }* * * * *, , , ,q w L nπ : 
 
1 1 1 1
1
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
44 4 4 4
F F F F F
q w L nn
F F F F Fq
q w L nn
F F F F Fw
nq w L n
L FF F F F
n nq w L
ππ
π
π
π
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞ ∂∂ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟ ∂∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂⎜ ⎟ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
 (10) 
The determinant of the large matrix is simply the Jacobian J  of the original system 
expressed in (9). By using Cramer’s rule on (10) one can see that: 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
F F F F
n q w L
F F F F
n q w L
F F F F
n q w L
F F F F
n q w L
n J
π
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ =∂  (11) 
 Equation (11) shows that two pieces of information are needed to calculate this 
result, which are the Jacobian J  and the F n∂ ∂  terms present in (10). This is where 
numerical methods prove useful, as many non-linear solvers provide direct estimates of 
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the matrix J at the solution point. Furthermore, the way the equations are formatted, 
shown in Equation (8.1), the right hand side of 1 4F F−  is equal to zero for the solution 
set { }* * * * *, , , ,q w L nπ . Given a disturbance ε close to the computational tolerance of the 
solver3, the following approximation can therefore be made: 
( )( )* * * * *, , , ,π ε
ε
+∂
∂ ?
ii
F q w L nF
n
 
Once the solver calculates the solution set { }* * * * *, , , ,q w L nπ , it is therefore possible to 
obtain numerical estimates for both F n∂ ∂  and J  which allow us to directly determine 
the stability of the equilibrium nπ∂ ∂  using (11), without any extra analytical work. 
This can be done without actually having to work out explicitly the partial derivatives or 
the implicit functions that describe the equilibrium. 
  
 Because Puga (1999) provides analytical solutions for the stability breakpoints 
of the symmetric equilibrium, it is possible to test the validity of this implicit function 
methodology. For the migration version, the analytical prediction made in Puga (1999) 
is that the symmetric equilibrium is stable if the following condition is met: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1
12
1
σσ γ µ γτ µ γ σ γ µ γ η
−
2
⎛ ⎞2 −1 + 1−⎜ ⎟> +⎜ ⎟1− 1− 1− 1− −1 −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 (12) 
Figure 1 shows a plot of (12), as well as the implicit function stability measure derived 
from a simulation of (1.1)-(1.4). Both use the parameter values from Puga (1999)4.  
                                                 
3 This is usually left to the discretion of the researcher, but typical values are around 
10e-6 to 10e-9 
4 These are the values in Figures 1-3 of Puga (1999): 
0.1,  0.55,  ,   and 11γ θ µ σ η= = = 0.2 = 4 =  
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The important result is that although the functional form is clearly different, both 
functions change sign at the same point, at τ =1.6 . The difference between the two 
functional forms probably stems from the fact that the Puga (1999) analytical condition 
is obtained through a simplification, and therefore only includes the parts of the 
analytical jacobian that determine the change in sign. 
 
In Puga (1999) the analytical stability condition in the absence of migration is 
given by equation (13), which is quadratic in στ 1− . A positive value of the function 
indicates a long-run stability of the symmetric equilibrium and a negative value, in 
between the roots of the quadratic, means the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, and the 
only long run outcome is agglomeration. 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
σ
σ
σ µ µ η µ γ τ
σ µ η σ µ σ γµ τ
µ σ µ η γ
21−
2 1−
1+ −1 1+ 1+ + 1−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−2 1+ −1 1+ − 1− 2 −1 −⎣ ⎦
+ 1− 1− −1 +1− > 0
 (13) 
 
Figure 1: Analytical and Simulated Stability Conditions 
Puga (1999) migration case 
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Figure 2 shows a plot of (13) and the numerical stability condition obtained 
through the implicit function methodology5. As for the migration case, the analytical 
and numerical breakpoints correspond exactly. Again, the functional forms are slightly 
different, but this can be explained by the fact that as for (12), condition (13) is obtained 
though a simplification and only contains the parts of the analytical jacobian that relate 
to the change in signs. The important result, however, is that as for the migration case, 
the two functions share the same roots and their signs change in the same way. 
Figures 1 and 2 confirm that even though the jacobian J  and the shocks 
F n∂ ∂  are not exact values but numerical approximations given by the solver, the 
implicit function methodology can predict the breakpoints of the system, without any 
prior analytical work. Although this is of little interest for the Puga (1999) model as the 
analytical stability conditions already exist, it can prove useful in situations where the 
analytical calculations are not tractable. This could be situations where the presence of 
                                                 
5 The parameter for figure 2 are the values from Figure 4 of Puga (1999): 
0.1,  0.55,  4,   and 11γ θ µ σ η= = = 0. = 4 =  
 
Figure 2: Analytical and Simulated Stability Conditions 
Puga (1999) non-migration case 
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more regions, more sectors, or more agglomeration channels makes the analytical 
derivation of a stability function more complicated. 
 
 
4. Stability of the extended Puga model with migration 
 
The migration version of the extended model, in other words the full system 
(7.1)-(7.5), is simulated using the same parameters as for Figure 1, so that the effect of 
the extension on the equilibrium can be evaluated. For the purpose of this section, the 
parameters on the extension are set at 0.05 for the friction share χ and at 0.5 for the non-
linearity parameter φ. In this simulation, therefore, the urban friction is a relatively 
small effect, but it will nevertheless be shown to be important. In order to provide an 
element of sensitivity analysis, simulations were carried out with χ and φ parameters 
around the values used. The results of these simulations are presented in Figures 5 and 
6, in appendix. Figure 3 shows the long run equilibrium path of the share of 
manufacturing for the system as a function of transport cost. Two important 
observations can be made from the analysis of this figure.  
First of all, Figure 3 shows that at low levels of transport cost agglomeration 
ceases to be a stable outcome, and manufacturing disperses itself over regions again. 
This is not the case in the original model, where there is only one bifurcation away from 
the symmetric equilibrium, aroundτ =1.6 , and it is the only stable outcome for lower 
levels of the transport cost.  
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Figure 3: Path of Spatial Equilibrium w.r.t Transport Cost 
Extended model with migration 
 
The economic rationale for this is shown in equation (5). With urban frictions, 
disposable income is reduced, which reduces consumer demand for all goods, and 
slightly reduces the profitability of locating in a city. With migration, total 
agglomeration implies a large city and high per capita friction costs, as all the firms are 
located there, as well as most of the labour. As transport cost drop and manufacturing 
output increases, so do nominal wages, attracting even more labour and pushing the 
friction costs up again. 
As transport costs keep falling, a critical level is passed where it becomes 
profitable for a firm to switch regions. The cost of moving is having to pay the transport 
cost twice, once while importing the intermediate inputs from the city and the second 
when exporting the output back there, where most of the demand is still located. As 
transport costs fall, so does this cost, for obvious reasons. The benefit of moving is the 
increase in consumer expenditure following the reduction in city size and frictions when 
the firm decides to move. As transport costs fall, this benefit increases. The 
agglomerated city size increases as transport costs fall, and the positive effect on 
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expenditure of a firm relocating will be bigger the lower the transport cost. In that 
respect, the migration case becomes much similar to the non migration case, in that the 
agglomerated equilibrium will disperse when transport costs fall below a critical level. 
 
The second observation is that the partially agglomerated portion of the 
equilibrium path, between the 0.5share =  and 0 or 1share =  lines, is now stable in the 
long run, which was not the case in the original Puga (1999) model. This can be inferred 
from Figure 3, as the partial agglomeration path curves are located in between the 
breakpoints rather than on either side, as was the case for the tomahawk bifurcations in 
Puga (1999). Even though for this set of parameters total agglomeration in one of the 
two regions is the dominant form of agglomeration, the paths leading to it are also 
stable in the long run. This is probably the more important of the two changes present in 
this part of the model, as it shows that the inclusion of urban frictions can indeed lead to 
situations where the economy agglomerates only partially in a region. 
The reason for this is again linked to equation (5). In the original Puga (1999), at 
the symmetric equilibrium, all variables are equal in both regions. Assuming the level of 
transport costs allows for agglomeration to occur, if one firm moves from region 2 to 
region 1, it will slightly increase the demand for labour in region 1, pushing wages up. 
This in turn creates a small migration of workers from region 2 to region 1, attracted by 
the slightly higher wages. Region 1 now has a bigger wage bill than region 2, which 
translates into higher demand for goods. This triggers the migration of more firms from 
region 2 to region 1, wanting to locate close to this demand, pushing up wages again 
and creating migration. This bang-bang effect continues until all the firms have located 
in region 1. 
With urban frictions reducing disposable income, this bang-bang property is 
inhibited. The first firm moves from region 2 to region 1, wages increase and a few 
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workers move to follow the firm. With the extension, this now increase the per capita 
friction cost, reducing the proportion of the wage bill spent on goods. So, on the one 
hand, the wage bill is larger, but on the other hand less of it is spent on goods. If the two 
balance out, effective demand doesn’t increase and no more firms will want to move. 
The partial equilibrium has become stable, and it takes a further drop in transport cost to 
increase agglomeration. 
The sensitivity analysis in appendix, more particularly Figure 5, shows that for 
some higher values of the χ and φ parameters, partial agglomeration is the only form of 
agglomeration possible, even with migration. Total agglomeration remains the dominant 
type of agglomeration in most cases, but it is possible to show situations where this does 
not happen. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that the portions of the long-run equilibrium 
paths for which there is partial agglomeration are stable. The relevance of this is that it 
shows that the stability of the partially agglomerated equilibrium is a property of the 
extended model, and not the accidental by-product of the parameters chosen.  
 
Figure 4:  Comparison of Simulated Stability Conditions 
Original and extended migration cases 
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A comparison of the symmetric equilibrium stability condition obtained using 
the implicit function method with the stability condition for the original Puga model is 
shown in Figure 4. It reveals that the presence of an urban friction reduces the range of 
transport costs over which agglomeration occurs. This is also true of all the sensitivity 
simulations shown in Figure 6, in appendix. This is where the implicit function 
methodology developed previously proves useful. It facilitates the analysis of stability, 
as the inclusion of the per capita friction cost variable c and its interaction with wages w 
and the number of firms n makes the determination of analytical stability functions 
much more complicated.  
Including urban frictions, even in an abstract manner, therefore seems to reduce 
the range over which any form of agglomeration is possible, partial or total. This can be 
linked to the reduction in consumer disposable income resulting from the existence of 
an urbanisation friction, and the resulting reduction in consumer demand. In particular, 
as shown above, this is what explains the observed instability of agglomeration for low 
transport costs. 
 
Importantly, an analysis of Figures 4 and 6 shows that the occurrence of 
agglomeration in the simulations is sensitive to the friction share parameter χ. In other 
words, the presence of rents is strong dissaglomeration force and agglomeration only 
occurs for low values of χ. With the original Puga model parameters, any value of χ 
significantly above the maximum one tested (0.06) leads to the complete absence of 
agglomeration. Furthermore, the non-linear parameter φ is also less than one, and any 
value significantly above the ones tested here again leads to the complete stability of the 
symmetric equilibrium. What this shows is that in the presence of migration, the urban 
friction has a large leverage on the presence and type of agglomeration, and small 
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variations in parameters have large influences on the agglomeration outcome for the 
manufacturing sector. 
Compared to the migration version of the Puga (1999) model, agglomeration is 
less likely, due to the extra dissaglomeration force introduced by the urban land market. 
When agglomeration does, occur, however, it can be both partial and stable in the long 
run. This is an important result, as it confirms that including the costs of agglomeration, 
an improvement in itself, can produce a richer range of agglomeration outcomes. 
 
 
5. Stability of the extended Puga model in the absence of migration 
 
Similar to the structure of the original Puga (1999) model, the non-migration 
version of the extended model consists of the reduced system (7.1)-(7.4), where the 
equation which equalises real wages over regions, (7.5), is dropped. Again, the main 
model parameters for this version are the same as the ones used in the non-migration 
version of Puga (1999), in Figure 2. For the friction parameters, the friction share 
parameter χ is set at 0.5 and the non-linearity is left at 0.5. This means that for an 
equally sized city, the per capita cost of agglomeration is higher than in the previous 
simulation, and increases in city size will have a higher impact on friction costs. As for 
the previous section, a sensitivity analysis was carried out on the friction cost 
parameters. The main results of these simulations are shown in Figures 9 and 10 in 
appendix. 
Figure 7 shows the long run equilibrium path of the share of manufacturing that 
results from the simulation.  
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Figure 7: Path of Spatial Equilibrium w.r.t Transport Cost 
Extended model with migration 
 
Comparing the result of this simulation with the original version of the non-
migration Puga (1999) model, the effect of the extension is initially less surprising than 
in the migration case. Indeed, there is at least no major change in the bifurcations. 
Overall, in both the original and extended models, the symmetric equilibrium stays 
stable for low and high values of the transport costs, and agglomeration only occurs for 
an intermediate range. 
The difference with the original Puga model is that there is now no total 
agglomeration, and a partially agglomerated equilibrium is the only alternative to the 
symmetric equilibrium. This is also visible in Figure 9 in appendix. The economic 
reasons behind this are similar to the migration case. The purchasing power of workers 
is lower than in the original model, which makes locating in a city less profitable for 
firms. The difference, in this version, is that because there is no migration, workers are 
not able to follow firms as they change regions, making total agglomeration much more 
difficult. In a situation where a large proportion of manufacturing is located in region 1, 
the wages manufacturing firms have to pay will be high, because without migration 
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labour is scarce. At the same time, the urban area is large, because most of the firms are 
located there, so the per capita urban friction costs are high, and a significant part of the 
wages paid are not converted into consumer demand. Manufacturing costs are therefore 
high, due to high wages, and the presence of frictions means that consumer demand is 
lower than in the original model. Furthermore, due to the absence of migration a large 
portion of the demand is still located in region 2, and a firm wanting to ship goods there 
is subject to transport costs. 
At some point during the agglomeration process, which depends on the friction 
cost parameters, it will become profitable for a firm to locate in region 2, where labour 
inputs are more plentiful and cheaper, and cater for the demand located there. At this 
point, the city located in region two has only a small share of manufacturing firms. 
Urbanisation costs are therefore lower than in region 1, and more of the region 2 wage 
bill gets converted into demand.  Total agglomeration in region 1 is therefore extremely 
difficult in this case, as the alternative of locating in a region that has cheaper labour 
inputs and a relatively high demand will become profitable before total agglomeration 
occurs. 
 
The possibility of a stable partially agglomerated path without migration in the 
Puga model is not new, as it was shown in figures 6 and 7 of Puga (1999) it is possible 
to obtain a path similar to Figure 7 above. The relevance of the extension in this case is 
that the partial agglomeration is achieved with the same structural parameters as in the 
original Puga (1999)6. The partial agglomeration result of Puga (1999) relies on an 
extreme value of the θ parameter, which is set at 0.94. θ being the elasticity of 
agricultural output with respect to labour, this implies an incredibly labour-intensive 
agricultural sector, with an elasticity of agricultural output with respect to land of only 
                                                 
6 These are σ, µ, γ, and θ. 
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0.06. This means that although partial agglomeration can be obtained in the non-
migration version of Puga (1999), it is not a general property of the model. This is not 
the case here, where the structural parameters are unchanged compared to the original 
version of the Puga model and where the partially agglomerated equilibrium is a 
widespread result that stems from urban frictions.  
 
Another important aspect of the non-migration version of this extension is its 
effect on the range of transport costs over which the symmetric equilibrium is stable. 
Figure 8 shows a comparison of the original and extended stability functions calculated 
using the implicit function method. When compared to the migration case in Figure 4, 
what stands out is that in the non-migration case, the effect of the extension on the range 
of agglomeration is more complex and ambiguous. The presence of urban frictions 
doesn’t simply push the stability function up, as was the case for migration. A quick 
look at the sensitivity analysis in Figure 10 in appendix confirms that this is also the 
case on a wider range of friction costs parameters.  
 
Figure 8:  Comparison of Simulated Stability Conditions 
Original and extended non-migration cases 
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For the higher range of transport costs, the effect of the extension on the stability 
function is the same as in the migration case. Because consumer demand is constrained 
to be spread over regions and transport costs between regions are still high, the presence 
of frictions decreases disposable income and reduces the profitability of locating in a 
city. The counter-intuitive aspect is that although rents reduce consumer spending, 
agglomeration is sustainable below the original Puga (1999) critical point. What 
explains this sustained agglomeration is that in the absence of migration and for low 
values of the transport cost, partial agglomeration is just as profitable as dispersion. The 
presence of frictions just makes it stable in the long run. 
The profitability argument stems from the absence of migration. At the 
symmetric equilibrium, just to the left of the original lower breakpoint, the spreading of 
manufacturing firms across regions means that wages are low. As a result, consumer 
demand is lower than in the presence of a city, where the high labour demand and 
absence of migrant labour create high wages. This is what underpins the profitability of 
partial agglomeration. Because labour supply is fixed by the absence of migration, 
wages will strongly increase in response to agglomeration. Therefore, it is profitable for 
some firms to agglomerate in one region, increase the city size and boost consumer 
demand with higher wages. The presence of some agglomerated firms also reduces the 
cost of procuring intermediate inputs. Furthermore, because of the relatively low level 
of transport costs, it is possible to ship the output produced in this small city to the other 
region, where a lot of demand is still located. This will be the case until the transport 
cost drops below a certain point, at which point the dispersion force of being able to 
costlessly ship intermediate inputs from and outputs to any region will become too 
strong to make partial agglomeration profitable. 
Importantly, this effect is also visible in the original Puga model, and does not 
depend on the presence of a cost of urbanisation. In the original non-migration version, 
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for transport costs just below the lower breakpoint, there exists a partially-agglomerated 
long run equilibrium, even though it is unstable in the long run. However, because the 
urban frictions inhibit the bang-bang transitions of the model, in the extended case this 
partial agglomeration equilibrium becomes stable. 
 In terms of sensitivity, an analysis of Figures 9 and 10 in appendix indicates that 
this version of the model is less sensitive to the friction share χ than the migration 
version. Increasing χ affects the range and scope of agglomeration, but to a lesser extent 
than the migration version. The parameter is also set an order of magnitude higher than 
in the migration version. In the absence of migration of workers, the city size will never 
increase as much as in the migration case, so one would expect to have to increase χ 
more to obtain similar effects.  
 
 
6. Comparison with the Puga (1999) results and discussion 
 
Section 2 shows that the extended model developed nests the original Puga 
framework. What this means is that it is possible to use exactly the same structural 
parameters as in Puga (1999) and modify the urban friction independently to evaluate 
the effect of the extension. The previous section show the main result is that partial 
agglomeration becomes can be a stable long run equilibrium. This is an important point 
for NEG, in view of recent analytical results in Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano 
and Robert-Nicoud (2006), which suggest that partial agglomeration is always unstable 
in Dixit-Stiglitz models. Their result is challenged by fact that the inclusion of urban 
frictions can create stable partial agglomeration. This is a point that needs to be 
explored further. In particular, analytical work needs to be carried out, along the lines of 
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the studies mentioned above, to explore the general properties of NEG models with 
specific urban frictions 
In addition, the figures in appendix show that small changes in urban costs can 
have large effects on the location of the agglomeration path. In particular, the sensitivity 
of the agglomeration to the friction cost parameters is different in the two versions of 
the model. This underlines the need to evaluate and understand the degree of 
imperfectness in migration when targeting urban costs. The same policy can have a 
different effect on agglomeration depending on how free migration. As mentioned in 
Combes et al (2005), this is an aspect of the field that has received little attention.  
Another central finding is the complex influence that urban frictions have on the 
stability function in the absence of migration. This affects studies that test the analytical 
Puga (1999) breakpoints. A first example is the sectoral test of the Puga breakpoints 
carried out in Head and Mayer (2004). Using data from two pairs of countries USA-
Canada and France-Germany, this study calculates the range of transport costs over 
which 21 different industrial sectors should be agglomerated. When comparing the 
range of transport costs with the actual situation in those sectors, the finding is that 
nearly all the industrial sectors should be disaggregated. Head and Mayer point out that 
cautious interpretation is needed as the ranges are quite sensitive to the parameters 
chosen. 
 Another case is the Brakman et al (2006) test of agglomeration in the EU. This 
study attempts to tackle the often thorny issue of testing new economic geography 
models. Using EU data, an equilibrium wage equation derived from the Puga model is 
estimated. This provides estimates for the elasticity σ  and the transport costτ . The 
Puga (1999) specification is then used with these estimates to determine the level of 
agglomeration in the EU using. As is the case in Head and Mayer (2004), Brakman et al 
recognise that the assumptions behind the Puga model are unrealistic, and a lot of 
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corner-cutting has to be done in order to get reasonable estimates of the parameters, 
particularly as the analytical Puga breakpoints in are only valid for a two-region world. 
The central result of the study is that agglomeration forces seem to be too weak to 
explain the spatial structure of the EU. Importantly, they claim that agglomeration 
forces that arise from Puga the puga model are smaller than those generated in Krugman 
(1991). 
Using the extended model and the different stability functions obtained, there is 
little doubt that the predictions agglomeration in Head and Mayer (2004) and Brakman 
et al (2006) would be different. The relative weakness of agglomeration they find in the 
Puga model compared to other NEG models would be affected, as this paper shows that 
with an urbanisation cost the breakpoints can be further apart. This is not to say that the 
problems pointed out in these two studies would necessarily be solved by this extended 
version of Puga (1999), particularly as far as the number of regions or sectors is 
concerned. However, what is clear is that urban frictions of the kind presented here 
affect both the range and scope of agglomeration and not including them in an empirical 
study will probably bias the results. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The central finding of this paper is that it is possible to obtain stable partial 
agglomeration within a vertically linked Dixit-Stiglitz model by accounting for the extra 
social costs of urbanisation. This is true for both versions of the Puga framework, when 
migration between regions is allowed, or not. Furthermore, simulations using a wider 
range of friction cost parameters have shown that whilst the presence of partial 
agglomeration is widespread, it is also sensitive to the parameters chosen. This is 
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especially true for the migration case, where very small changes in the parameters have 
large effects in terms of agglomeration. 
Importantly, what drives the partial agglomeration result in both cases is the 
reduction in the disposable income due to urban friction costs. In the original Puga 
model, all of the wages are spent on goods. The extension introduces a friction that 
reduces the disposable income of workers and reducing demand as a result, making it 
slightly less profitable for firms to agglomerate. In the simple framework assumed, this 
happens as a result of an urbanisation cost that is paid for by the entire population. The 
examples mentioned are pollution or the cost of urban infrastructure. However, even 
with more complex urbanisation frictions and a more realistic spread of costs it would 
be possible to obtain the results shown in this study. What this means is that stable 
partial agglomeration can result directly from a reduction in demand linked to the 
existence and size of a city. Any mechanism which reduces the disposable income of 
workers based on the size of the urban area would provide a similar effect. This has 
been shown to have important theoretical consequences on existing new economic 
geography theory. 
Last of all, the implicit function methodology developed in this study shows its 
relevance, allowing the comparison of stability functions between the versions without 
requiring prior analytical derivations. In the migration case, the presence of frictions 
creates a dispersion force which reduces range of transport costs over which 
agglomeration occurs. The non-migration case, however, is more complex, and 
comparison of the original and extended stability shows that depending on the land 
market parameters the range can be narrower, or wider than in the initial Puga (1999) 
specification. 
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 Figure 5: Sensitivity of the migration equilibrium to friction cost parameters, equilibrium path 
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 Figure 6: Sensitivity of the migration equilibrium to friction cost parameters, stability condition 
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 Figure 9: Sensitivity of the non-migration equilibrium to friction cost parameters, equilibrium path 
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 Figure 10: Sensitivity of the non-migration equilibrium to friction cost parameters, stability condition 
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